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multi-player games. Our method in general allows for this extra flexibility.
Let p n,m,t (x <t ) = P (X n,m (t) = 1)(x <t ) denote the probability of individ-86 ual I n being in place P m at time t given the history of the system x <t . For 87 any given individual, we thus have 88 m p n,m,t (x <t ) = 1 ∀n, t, x <t .
It may be that not all individuals can go to all places, and that each 89 individual I n has a subset of the overall set of places P n available to it. A 90 home range or territory of individual I n is defined by 91 P n = {P m ; p n,m,t (x <t ) > 0 for some t and some history x <t } (5)
i.e. is the set of places that I n has a non-zero probability of visiting at some 92 point. 93 In our general framework the whole population follows a single random 94 process, which can depend upon its entire history. This would be very com- 95 plex, and perhaps not very realistic, and there are a number of simplifications 96 that we can make based upon different types of independence, some of which 97 we discuss in Appendix A. We consider two important concepts only here. 98 It may be that a given population distribution is independent of the 99 history of the process so that 100 P (X(t) = x)(x <t ) = P (X(t) = x).
In this case we call the model history-independent. we simply call the model independent and can think of it in terms of a bi-103 partite graph as in Figure 1 . In Appendix A we discuss some intermediate 104 cases between history independence and (full) independence. 105 
Fitnesses

106
To model the evolution of a population, we must evaluate the fitnesses 107 of the individuals. In general the fitness of each individual depends upon 108 which place(s) it visits, which other individuals also visit the same place, the reward to I n thus becomes R(n, x). Note that if fitness did directly 119 depend on time, and not just through how time affected the distribution 120 of individuals, and we had to evaluate fitness at different time points e.g. 121 to update the population composition through evolutionary dynamics, then 122 the explicit inclusion of time would still be necessary. We also note that 123 for homogeneous history independent processes this is entirely equivalent to 124 more general reward functions, since in this case R(n, x, t, x <t ) ≡ R(n, x). 125 Perhaps the most natural reward function, and the one that we will gen-126 erally use, is the mean reward, which we label R n where 127 R n = x P (X = x)R(n, x). 
Often the reward to an individual will only depend upon the place that 134 it occupies and the group of individuals at that place. We label such payoffs 135 as direct group interaction payoffs, and in such cases
where R(n, m, χ G ) is the reward to I n at place P m occupied by group G and 137 then 138 the scenario in Figure 2a ) where there are three individuals I 1 , I 2 , I 3 and 143 each one of them can move freely within a territory in the shape of a square.
144
The individuals' territories overlap, creating six distinct places P 1 , . . . , P 6 .
145
Assuming the territories are relatively small and that individuals roam freely 146 and randomly, we may assume that at any given time, the probability of an 147 individual being at a place within its own territory is proportional to the 148 area of the place. We thus get an independent model with 
We get, for example, that all of the individuals can be together only at place 150 P 3 and, by (11), that happens with probability p 1,3 p 2,3 p 3,3 = 1 64 . Also, a 151 group G = {I 1 , I 3 } can meet either on P 2 or P 3 and we get, Figure 2: Territorial interaction model. a) The territory of individual I 1 is the square in grey, the territory of I 2 is the square encompassed by the dotted lines, the territory of I 3 is the square encompassed by full lines; b) is the corresponding graphical representation as a general independent model.
3.2. The boundary interaction model 153 We similarly introduce a general model of interactions within a popula- is the corresponding graphical representation as a general independent model; c) is an alternative visualization as pairwise interactions on graphs.
guarded boundary, we get that the interactions can only be pairwise with 162 the corresponding p n,m given below. We get 
In general, we consider a graph with I 1 , . . . , I N as individuals on vertices, 164 and places as edges, as shown on Figure 3c ). Any place can contain at most 165 two individuals and there are M = N (N − 1)/2 places, some of which may 166 be empty with probability 1, if the edge does not exist on the graph. We 167 write P {n,n } for a place at the edge between individuals I n and I n .
168
In Appendix B we discuss the reward function for the boundary inter-169 action model, and discuss some potentially important consequences for the 170 evaluation of reward functions for evolutionary games on graphs. Figure 4c ).
182
Suppose that for each individual on a leaf, the probability that they go to 183 the centre is λ, and so the probability that they stay on a leaf is 1 − λ, and 184 that the probability that the individual from the centre stays in the centre 185 is µ, it going to each leaf with equal probability (1 − µ)/(N − 1) otherwise. 186 We get
An individual from the leaf can be in the following groups:
188
• alone (either on the leaf or in the centre),
189
• with the centre individual only (either on the leaf or in the centre), The respective probabilities of seeing such a group are as follows:
An individual from the centre can be in the following groups:
195
• alone (either in the centre or on one of the leaves),
196
• with one other individual, either in the centre or on one of the leaves; 197 there are N − 1 distinct pairs for each of these two possibilities,
198
• with k > 1 others (in the centre); there are N −1 k such distinct groups.
199
The prospective probabilities thus become
If E(n) denotes the mean size of the group where I n is, we get from above
for the centre individual; (n = 1)
, for a leaf individual; (n > 1).
For fixed λ and µ and any 2 ≤ n ≤ N , we get that the ratio E(n)/E(1) tends 202 to λ/µ in the limit N → ∞. When λ = 1/2 and µ = 1/N , we get
Numerical values for a specific example are shown in Table 1 .
Focal from leaf 0.45 0.2625 0.1875 0.0875 0.0125 1.95
Focal from centre 0.4125 0.45 0.075 0.05 0.0125 1.8
Average 0.4425 0.3 0.165 0.08 0.0125 1.92 Table 1 : Numerical values of P (|G| = i) and expected group size E[|G|] on the star for N = 5, λ = 1/2 and µ = 1/5. The randomly selected individual has probability of 1/5 of being in the centre which gives the values for the average individual.
The role of strategy and example games 205
In general, we would often find the distribution of groups as above, then 206 play the game within each possible group. Thus if we can define the payoffs 207 in any given mixture of individuals, we can find the payoffs in the overall 208 game. This is the scenario in our first example. It is possible also that how 209 individuals move between places is a strategic decision, and we explore this 210 possibility in our second example. 
Thus this situation is an example of direct group interaction payoffs introduced in Section 2.2, since the behaviour of individuals outside the group has no effect on the fitness of group members. We suppose that all individuals play a mixed strategy with probability α of playing Hawk (and so probability 1 − α of playing Dove). Thus conditional upon the size of the group being k + 1 the number of Hawk groupmates an individual will have follows a Binomial distribution with parameters k and α, so that the probability that an individual will have h Hawk and d = k − h Dove groupmates is given by
The expected payoff for Dove (E D ) and for Hawk (E H ) are thus given by
Let us now consider this game on the star with N = 5, λ = 1/2 and 221 µ = 1/5, V = 1 and C = 2 as described in contest which would be significantly more complicated (there would be two 229 distinct roles here for the star, but in general there could be many roles). We 230 further note that to consider evolution on a finite population fully, we would 231 need to explicitly consider the dynamics of the process, which is outside the 232 scope of this paper. Since, by (31)-(32) and the values in Table 1 ,
we get that α = 0.353 is the only root of (33) in the allowable interval [0, 1].
234
Furthermore the derivative of the right-hand side of (33) with respect to α 235 is negative, so α = 0.353 is the unique ESS. of the previous example, where the strategy affected the payoffs but not the 246 population distribution. It is of course possible for strategies to affect both 247 the population distribution, and the payoffs conditional on this distribution.
248
Let us assume that all but one individual plays p and find the optimal 249 strategy for our focal individual. We look for values of p such that p is the 250 best choice of our focal individual in a population of p-players. In order to 251 determine the rewards to the individual, we will use a cost-benefit model,
where benefits come from foraging at a particular place and 253 costs come to an individual in two forms -direct costs from (potential) fights 254 with others trying to forage at the same place and indirect costs from having 255 its home place foraged by others. The notation for this model is summarised 256 in Table 2 .
257
If our individual stays at home, it will get a benefit B H but will have to 258 fight and the place will be depleted by on average d·p/d = p other individuals.
259
The expected reward will thus be 260
If our individual goes to a neighbouring place P m , it will get the benefit B I .
261
There will be on average (d − 1) · p/d other intruders in P m and the owner 262 will also be there with probability (1 − p); our focal individual will have to 263 fight with all of them. There will still be on average d · p/d = p individuals 264 coming to its home; it will not fight with them but will pay the indirect cost 265 L I per individual. Thus, the expected reward when leaving the home place
We see that this situation is not an example of direct group interaction 
We can now perform the ESS analysis. If
then staying at home is the best response to everybody staying at home. 
then always intruding is an ESS. When neither (38) nor (39) holds, then 279 there is a mixed ESS p ∈ (0, 1) given by
It is clear that if (38) is on the contribution from F I ; the larger the degree of the graph, the more 286 likely that other intruders will have to be fought. It is reasonable to assume 287 that F I > 0, and so the larger d, the less attractive intruding is. It may 288 thus happen that intruding is an ESS when d is small but it is not an ESS 289 when d is large (even if the other parameters stay the same), see Figure 5a ).
290
When there is a mixed ESS, from (40), increasing d decreases the probability 291 of intruding at the ESS, see Figure 5b ). Similarly when there are two pure 292
ESSs the threshold value of the unstable equilibrium increases. sizes. Hence, if the group sizes vary between two given different structures, 299 we expect the payoffs to vary as well.
300
However, we also want to know whether the structure influences the pay-301 offs in some other way as well. We take the approach of comparing a given 302 place structure with an appropriate well-mixed population. This would then 303 allow us to compare different place structures with each other through the 304 medium of their respective well-mixed populations; making it a fair compar-305 ison not biased by the different group sizes. In this section we shall only con-306 sider independent processes, as such comparisons are harder in other cases. 307 We will call a comparison between a given place model and a well-mixed 308 population fair if the mean group size of the two situations is the same.
309
What do we mean by a well-mixed population? In the game theoretical an identical distribution over the places (i.e. p n 1 ,m = p n 2 ,m for all n 1 , n 2 , m).
318
These movements need not be independent; for instance in pairwise games 319 each contest only involves two players, so knowing that a given player is in-320 volved necessarily reduces the chance of the involvement of a given second 321 player (and so such a situation is not row independent according to our defi-322 nition from Appendix A). As we are only considering independent processes 323 here, there is a natural interpretation of well-mixedness in this case; namely 324 that in addition to all individuals having an identical distribution over the 325 places, they all move independently of each other.
326
This does not fully specify a unique well-mixed distribution, and to make 327 fair comparisons it would be convenient to do so. We have already specified 328 that all individuals are equivalent, and if we extend this to all places being 329 equivalent also (i.e. p n,m 1 = p n,m 2 ) then this gives the required uniqueness. 
Finally, there will be three groups of single individuals with probability
Hence, the probability of a randomly placed individual ending up in a group 361 of size 3, 2 and 1 respectively is 
Assuming that it is mixed (i.e. not pure Hawk), the unique ESS is obtained 381 by equating (51) and (53) giving
We now go back to the example game on the star with N = 5, V = 1, C = 383 2. As shown in Table 1 , the mean group size from the star was 1.92, so that 384 the fair comparison here equates 1.92 with 1 + (N − 1)p, giving p = 0.23.
385
Inserting these values in (54) we find that the ESS value is α = 0.394.
386
Thus the star graph has a lower Hawk proportion than the equivalent 387 completely mixed population. This is because the graph has a higher prob-388 ability of small and large groups, compared to the completely mixed popu-389 lation having a higher probability of intermediate groups i.e. the group size 390 on the star graph is more variable. This is more damaging to Hawks than 391 Doves as Doves do well when they are alone but do not suffer from being in 392 large groups, whereas Hawks can pay large costs in large groups. 393 We can illustrate this point about variability by the following. If we set 394 p = 1/N in the limit as N → ∞ for our Binomial distribution, we get the 395 limiting Poisson (1) distribution, which has a mean group size of 2 (the focal individual and one other). The payoffs become
The unique ESS for such a completely mixed population with random group 398 sizes when V = 1 and C = 2 is 0.364 which is much smaller than the 399 equivalent value of α = 0.5 when the group size is fixed at two. 400 6. Discussion
401
In this paper we have developed a new modelling framework to consider 402 the interaction of individuals in a non-homogeneous environment. Individ-403 uals (or groups) move at successive time points to different "places" where 404 they may interact with no, one or more than one other. Its most natural 405 interpretation, and the one we have focused on here, is that of a spatial rela-406 tionship between individuals, so that some can go to some places but not to 
431
A key influence on the outcome of multiplayer games is the number of 432 players involved. Thus if one structure generates different size groups to 433 another, then this can have a significant effect just through the sizes of the 434 groups generated. Such a group size effect certainly occurs for the multiplayer 435 Hawk-Dove game, for example. This is certainly of interest, but we are also 436 interested in effects caused by structural relationships between the individu-437 als. To consider this properly, we have defined the idea of "fair comparisons" 438 between different models, which requires the mean group size in each case 439 to be the same. When considering evolutionary games on graphs there is 440 not the same problem, as all games are pairwise. We note, however, that in 441 this case there is the related feature of the degree of a vertex, the number 442 of connections of an individual, and graph models are often compared using 443 different types of graphs with the same average degree.
444
As well as using existing game models, there is also a natural way to 445 develop new game models in the context of our framework; namely to have 446 the strategies of the individuals related to their probability to move to a 447 given place. Thus an animal may decide to go to one place and not another, 448 which will not affect any interactions given that they occur, but will affect 449 the likelihood of any given interaction occurring.
450
When modelling using evolutionary games on graphs, games played with 451 other individuals through the population structure leads to each individual 452 acquiring a fitness, and as we have seen, exactly the same occurs in our 453 framework as well. For evolutionary graph theory, the next step is for the 454 population to evolve following some appropriately defined dynamics. For ex-455 ample, the invasion process (IP) selects a random individual according to its 456 fitness, and this individual then replaces a randomly chosen neighbour with 457 a copy of itself. We have not considered dynamics in this paper, but we could 458 use very similar dynamics to those used in evolutionary graph theory. For ex-459 ample, an analogy of the IP would again pick an individual to reproduce with 460 a probability proportional to its fitness, and then groups could be reformed 461 at random, following the original procedure, and a random groupmate then 462 be selected to be replaced. It is clear that the question of dynamics in such 463 processes needs serious consideration. The purpose of the current paper, 464 however, was to introduce a framework for modelling interaction within a 465 population, and so we leave the consideration of dynamics to later work. 466 We should note here that an evolutionarily stable strategy is a static suggestions.
564
As we saw in Section 2.1, a population distribution is history-independent 672 if 673 P (X(t) = x)(x <t ) = P (X(t) = x).
We call a history independent process homogeneous if the population distri-674 bution is independent of time i.e.
675
P (X(s) = x) = P (X(t) = x) ∀s, t ≥ 1.
A given population distribution may not be independent of the history of 676 the process, but may depend only upon the most recent population distribu-677 tion. In this case we call the model Markov and we have 678 P (X(t) = x)(x <t ) = P (X(t) = x|X(t − 1) = x t−1 ),
and we denote this quantity simply as P (X(t) = x)(x t−1 ). For a given in- has happened in the past, then for any m 1 , m 2 we have 684 P (X n 1 ,m 1 (t) = 1 & X n 2 ,m 2 (t) = 1)(x <t ) = p n 1 ,m 1 ,t (x <t )p n 2 ,m 2 ,t (x <t ). (60)
It is possible that an individual is more likely to move to one boundary 706 than another (e.g. if the boundaries vary in size), as is the case in Figure 3 .
707
Supposing that this is not the case, and each boundary is visited with equal 708 probability, we get p n,{n,n } = A n,n /d n . Hence, assuming that the reward for where f n,{n} is the payoff when alone, which can perhaps be regarded as the 712 background fitness and f n,{n,n } is the payoff when being with individual n . 713 We note here that this reward function is different to those usually used 714 when modelling games on graphs. One common reward function is the total 715 reward [37, 38], where an individual plays a game against each of its neigh-716 bours and the overall reward is the sum of the payoffs of all of these games.
717
The reward to individual I n then is given by
Why should individuals gain rewards only when meeting others, and these 719 rewards be cumulative? Perhaps when individuals meet they swap informa-720 tion, so the more information that is obtained the better for the individual. 
which is the mean payoff in the well-mixed population for pairwise games.
754
Thus our framework is consistent with standard results for pairwise games. 
